PARTISAN MAKEUP OF STATE LEGISLATURE AND ABORTION RESTRICTION

Introduction

In 2012, more than 80 new abortion restrictions were enacted across the nation in various states. In Charles Wheelan’s Naked Statistics perspective, this statistics several interesting observations. First, there a significant push and pull around the abortion restriction policies between pro-lifers and pro-choice advocates. Secondly, the current administration seems to favor anti-abortion policies. Therefore, it is probable that some factors underlying the makeup of the legislature influence the enactment of abortion policies. One such factor is partisanship. This work contends that the fate of abortion restrictions lies in the partisanship makeup of the legislature. I have developed the argument programmatically, pulling out the available literature findings to nullify the hypothesis that there is a significant correlation between the enactment or repeal of abortion restrictions with the partisan makeup of the state legislature.

The Makeup of A State Legislature

Every state in the U.S. except Nebraska operates on a bicameral framework. The two-house model operates by voting or vetoing legislation, governor’s appointments, or article impeachment. Statute legislatures operate synonymously with the U.S. Congress. That is, it tackles matters brought on table by its member legislatively and interest groups, it lobbies to obtain legislation favors, and they influence other institutions in the state. Currently, the state’s legislators are voted in by a state’s voters. From that, the makeup of states’ legislature in the U.S. is prone to issues affecting politics such as public opinions and partisanship.

Partisanship

Partisanship is fanatic support for an idea or a person. It is not a new concept in American society. For instance, American politics has ever been themed by polarization, which is revealed in political parties through the media, and the publics’ ideology concerning what should or should not happen in the U.S. According to Clio et al., partisanship in the United States Congress has increased exponentially in the last 60 years, to reveal significant impacts on various societal systems.[1] For instance, party affiliation may affect a candidate’s chances to win in an election. In the same way, studies show that majority of people are strongly associated with particular party systems, such that they are not willing to buy the ideas of other parties.[2] For instance, the Republican party was developed in the same way: A group of people felt that the Kansas- Nebraska Act was not fair, opposed the government, and run a presidential candidature to deregister the Act.

Besides, partisanship has influenced the power differential between the state legislature and the judicially.[3] There is a persistent struggle between the Court and the legislature concerning which one is powerful, regardless of the separation of powers.  A study finds that Congress is likely to override the Court decisions that are not ideological with the legislative actors.[4] Data is collected on congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions between 1946 and 1990 and analyzed to find the percentage chance for Congress to override Court decisions on both legislative interests and based on ideological differences. Results from a two standard deviation shift around the ideological differences between the Court and the Congress reveal a 66.4% chance of Congressional override.[5]

The override is arguably an anomaly in the separation of powers within which the state legislature and the Court interacts, influenced by partisanship. Notably, policies are enacted by Congress or state legislatures as the final regulations or the supreme Court during its ruling. However, the legislature often infiltrates the court decision, so that the policies enacted align to its majority members’ political ideologies.[6] One way that the infiltration and override of powers occur is behavioral manipulation of the jury and judges.

Segal asserts that personal preferences and legal rules influence judicial behavior.[7] Further, the extent to which a judge makes a ruling is defined by the law and politics. In his view, judicial behavior is primarily influenced by legal rules and personal preferences, such as partisanship.[8] His work indicates that there is a significant association of votes cast by judges with their normative opinions concerning policies.[9] Hence, the fate of policies in both the Court and the Chambers is inherent in the predominantly partisan makeup of the ruling administration.

Abortion Restrictions

The Court established the first abortion policy in the 1973 Roe v. Wade case. In the case, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned Texas state policy that forbade abortion and effectively legalized the procedure across the United States.[10] Since then, the topic of abortion restrictions has raised significant controversy and interest divisions in American society. Both pro-choice and pro-life advocates have a rationale for their ideologies, which are backed by health, religion, and philosophical constructs. Due to that push and pull between what is morality, heath, and choice, the lawmakers have been enacting or repealing more abortion-related restrictions. For instance, the average restrictions per year have risen from 14 in 1983-2010 to 57 in 2011-2015.[11] Hill explains that the legislation on abortion has an evident trend, which continues sophisticating the bare minimum for women to undergo an abortion.[12] They include the banning of abortion before the fetus is visible, informed consent and waiting periods, restrictions on medical abortion, bans on insurance coverage, among others. Some states have more severe restrictions like Alabama, where nearly all reasons for abortion are thwarted.

Currently, the Supreme Court has failed to respond to the increasing restrictions enacted by the states since they do not directly challenge the constitutional right to abortion. Hence the type of abortion restrictions enacted is at the discretion of the state legislatures, which in turn are influenced by their partisan makeup. Overall, the nation is yet to see the enactment of comprehensive abolition policies or the overturning of Roe v. Wade 1973.

Relationship Between Partisanship and Abortion Restrictions

In the understanding of partisanship, the state legislature makes up, and the abortion restrictions, it is somewhat straightforward to underpin any clues to nullify the hypothesis. Further, it will require a focus on partisanship as featured in public opinion and political themes.

Firstly, the public attitude towards state legislatures and restrictions to abortions change over time with political waves and religiosity.[13] In a study focusing on the Texas statute, a significant correlation between public opinion and the political waves was revealed.[14] That is, every ruling government induces a worldview on social problems, which escalates or suppress the public opinion or call for legal intervention. For instance, Smith compares public attitudes before the Texas abortion legislation in 2010, after passing of the legislation in 2011, and after the 2013 legislature. The study concludes that support or lack of support for abortion by the public is influenced by political waves, which is a reflection of the implications of the state legislature in increasing partisanship.[15] In another study, O’Brian finds that the prevalent waves of legislation regarding restrictions on abortion are rooted in consensual public opinions.[16] He finds that the attitudes of voters, activists, and elites are correlated with their political interests. For instance, across a range of non-economic issues, Republicans are most likely to align with the ideologies of their presidential vote.[17] Therefore, the support or repeal or abortion restrictions by a legislature is a magnification of the public opinion, as revealed by their partisanship towards the ruling political government.

Studies have shown that the political outlook of the ruling governments has played a major role in shaping the various policies, including abortion policies. For instance, Republicans have insisted on the stricter laws and restrictions against the Roe v. Wade 1973.[18] In contrast, the Democrats advocates for the strengthening of the Roe v. Wade 1973. This divisiveness arises from the party’s ideologies in that Democrats fight for democracy, and Republicans are conservative. Therefore, policymaking is subject to a degree of favoritism based on partisanship.[19] For instance, if the majority of lawmakers in a state legislature are democrats, they are likely to reject stricter abortion restrictions. Further, governments choose supreme court judges who seemingly support their political ideologies. That way, the Obama administration challenged the enactment of more abortion restrictions compared to the current government.

Secondly, the ideological party’s influence on the process of lawmaking occurs in two dimensions. First, Congress and the state legislatures support or fight against a policy. The majority of lawmakers who affiliate to either the Democratic Party or the Republicans are likely to win and thus shape the policy. For instance, a study on call data of interest on a proposal for actions, or bills and legislations that produce new laws revealed that results heavily correlated with the majority of the house members and their partisanship.[20] Secondly, since the decision of the Court is at the discretion of the judge,[21] the judge may rule in favor of their partisan ideologies. The legislature may override the SOP to favor the opinion of the majority lawmakers.[22] That way, the majority of party partisans in the legislature work to succeed in their policies and agendas. Hence, the relationship between partisanship makes up of a state legislature, and the abortion restrictions are that the Democratic administration ought to support abortion, unlike republicans who seek stricter restrictions.

Conclusion

The literature above indicates that both the Court and the legislature, which have power to policymaking, are subject to partisanship. It affects the policymaking through manipulation of the court decisions and power of the majority house representatives. That way, the fate of abortion restrictions has remained the discretion of the majority for any ruling government. In a lay representation, the public votes in a legislature through partisanship, and the legislature influences the policymaking in its house and at the Court by overriding its decisions. That way, the Democratic administration ought to support abortion, unlike republicans who seek stricter restrictions. Hence, there is a significant correlation between the enactment or repeal of abortion restrictions with the partisan makeup of the state legislature.

Bibliography

Andris, Clio, David Lee, Marcus J. Hamilton, Mauro Martino, Christian E. Gunning, and John Armistead Selden. “The Rise Of Partisanship And Super-Cooperators In The U.S. House Of Representatives.” PLOS ONE 10, no. 4 (2015): e0123507. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0123507.

Budde, Emma, Stephan Heichel, Steffen Hurka, And Christoph Knill. “Partisan Effects In Morality, Policy-Making.” European Journal Of Political Research 57, no. 2 (2017): 427-449. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12233.

Hill, Jessie. “Legislative Restrictions On Abortion.” AMA Journal Of Ethics 14, no. 2 (2012): 133-136. doi: 10.1001/virtualmentor.2012.14.2.hlaw1-1202.

Killian, Mitchell, and Clyde Wilcox. “Do Abortion Attitudes Lead To Party Switching?”. Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 4 (2008): 561-573. doi:10.1177/1065912907312981.

O’Brian, Neil A. “Before Reagan: The Development of Abortion’s Partisan Divide.” Perspectives on Politics, 2019, 1-17. doi:10.1017/s1537592719003840.

Reingold, Rebecca B., and Lawrence O. Gostin. “State Abortion Restrictions And The New Supreme Court.” JAMA 322, no. 1 (2019): 21. doi:10.1001/jama.2019.8437.

Segal, Jeffrey A. “Judicial Behavior.” Oxford Handbooks Online, 2011. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.013.0014.

Smith, Chelsea. “Change Over Time In Attitudes About Abortion Laws Relative To Recent Restrictions In Texas.” Contraception 94, no. 5 (2016): 447-452. doi: 10.1016/j.contraception.2016.06.005.

Uribe, Alicia, James F. Spriggs, and Thomas G. Hansford. “The Influence Of Congressional Preferences On Legislative Overrides Of Supreme Court Decisions.” Law & Society Review 48, no. 4 (2014): 921-945. doi:10.1111/lasr.12109.

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[1] Andris, Clio, David Lee, Marcus J. Hamilton, Mauro Martino, Christian E. Gunning, and John Armistead Selden. “The Rise Of Partisanship And Super-Cooperators In The U.S. House Of Representatives.” PLOS ONE 10, no. 4 (2015): e0123507. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0123507.

[2] Budde, Emma, Stephan Heichel, Steffen Hurka, And Christoph Knill. “Partisan Effects In Morality, Policy-Making.” European Journal Of Political Research 57, no. 2 (2017): 427-449. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12233. p. 429

[3] Ibid.

[4] Uribe, Alicia, James F. Spriggs, and Thomas G. Hansford. “The Influence Of Congressional Preferences On Legislative Overrides Of Supreme Court Decisions.” Law & Society Review 48, no. 4 (2014): 921-945. doi:10.1111/lasr.12109. p.921.

[5] Ibid. p.938.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Segal, Jeffrey A. “Judicial Behavior.” Oxford Handbooks Online, 2011. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.013.0014. p.2.

[8] Ibid. p.8.

[9] Ibid. p.11

[10] Hill, Jessie. “Legislative Restrictions On Abortion.” AMA Journal Of Ethics 14, no. 2 (2012): 133-136. doi: 10.1001/virtualmentor.2012.14.2.hlaw1-1202. P.133.

[11] Reingold, Rebecca B., and Lawrence O. Gostin. “State Abortion Restrictions And The New Supreme Court.” JAMA 322, no. 1 (2019): 21. doi:10.1001/jama.2019.8437.

[12] Hill, Jessie. “Legislative Restrictions On Abortion.” AMA Journal Of Ethics 14, no. 2 134.

[13] Smith, Chelsea. “Change Over Time In Attitudes About Abortion Laws Relative To Recent Restrictions In Texas.” Contraception 94, no. 5 (2016): 447-452. doi: 10.1016/j.contraception.2016.06.005. p.447

[14] Ibid. p.450

[15] Ibid p.448

[16] O’Brian, Neil A. “Before Reagan: The Development of Abortion’s Partisan Divide.” Perspectives on Politics, 2019, 1-17. doi:10.1017/s1537592719003840.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Reingold, Rebecca B., and Lawrence O. Gostin. “State Abortion Restrictions And The New Supreme Court.” JAMA 322, no. 1 (2019): 21. doi:10.1001/jama.2019.8437. p.E1

[19] Mitchell Killian and Clyde Wilcox, “Do Abortion Attitudes Lead To Party Switching?”, Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 4 (2008): 561-573, doi:10.1177/1065912907312981.

[20] Andris, Clio, David Lee, Marcus J. Hamilton, Mauro Martino, Christian E. Gunning, and John Armistead Selden. “The Rise Of Partisanship And Super-Cooperators In The U.S. House Of Representatives.” PLOS ONE 10, no. 4 (2015): e0123507. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0123507.

[21] Segal, Jeffrey A. “Judicial Behavior.” Oxford Handbooks Online, 2011. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.013.0014.

[22] Uribe, Alicia, James F. Spriggs, and Thomas G. Hansford. “The Influence Of Congressional Preferences On Legislative Overrides Of Supreme Court Decisions.” Law & Society Review 48, no. 4 (2014): 921-945. doi:10.1111/lasr.12109.